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Missiles, Mythologies and Misses
A Perspective on U.S. Space Launch Developments

By Wayne Eleazer
The history of the American space launch program has been one of both
successes and failures, but in many respects has been characterized and guided as
much by questionable assumptions and "mythologies" as it has by planned technological
achievement and careful program management. Ironically, while launching satellites is
considered to be the pinnacle of "hard" science and the ultimate in systems
management, the way in which space booster development has proceeded has been
anything but scientific, with few management principles of any kind discernible. That
tradition continues to this day.

The First Launch System
The first dedicated U.S. space launch program was Vanguard, begun in 1955.
Although for the previous ten years the U.S. military had underway ballistic missile
development programs, these were deliberately ignored under the belief that such
weapons programs should be kept separate from purely scientific efforts. This was the
first space launch mythology: the Vanguard Mythology. It stated that military programs
somehow tainted scientific efforts and should be kept separate. Its immediate result was
the assumption that military development experiences could be ignored. Ironically,
Vanguard ultimately became a U.S. Navy program, an approach which not only violated
the principle of separation but also denied it the experience gained in the Army and Air
Force programs. But coincidentally, the approach did result in the three major U.S.
military services each having their own space program.
Vanguard was a spectacular failure, and at a very bad time. No one had told the
Soviets of the mythology surrounding Vanguard, and unencumbered by such thinking
they proceeded to launch the worldÕs first artificial satellite utilizing the same SS-6
Sapwood missile they were building to threaten the United States. In response, the
Vanguard mythology was thrown away overnight and Werner Von BraunÕs U.S. Army
ballistic missile team was given the go-ahead to enter the realm of Òscientific researchÓ
space launch. A derivative of the Army Redstone ballistic missile (what we would now
term a ÒtheaterÓ weapon) the Jupiter C launch vehicle, was used to place AmericaÕs first
satellite, Explorer 1, into orbit on 31 January 1958. From that point on, it became
obvious that developments of military missiles were the most expeditious way to meet
most space launch requirements, thus establishing an approach which has continued for
over 40 years. The first space launch mythology had been overcome by practical
considerations.
Ironically, the Army's team led the way, but Air Force ballistic missile systems
became the basis for most U.S. space launch systems. There were various reasons for
the Air Force dominance, but one of the most important was the ancestry and
operational concept of the Army systems. The Army missiles were direct descents of
the WW II V-2 missile, and like their German ancestor, were designed to be
transportable and fired from relatively simple field sites. This was of great utility in
combat (as the Air Force found out in dealing with another V-2 descendent, the Scud),
but it made the Army missiles heavier and less efficient than the Air Force systems
which were mean to be launched from fixed installations. But even with the success of
the military-derived launch vehicles, (indeed, because of the success) a new mythology
was formed.

Missile Technology, Whether You Need It Or Not

Missile systems had to advance as weapons systems in order to meet new
challenges imposed by the Soviet threat. More American ICBMs had to be deployed to
counter increasing Soviet strategic missile forces, and that in turn emphasized the need
for U.S. missiles be operable simply and at low cost. The increasing numbers and
accuracy of Soviet missiles meant that U.S. missiles had to be more survivable, which
required the ability to launch from an underground silo as well as the use of more robust
flight hardware. A related factor was the combined advancements in the design of reentry vehicles and nuclear weapons enabled missiles to be made smaller, which
reduced the emphasis on throw weight and therefore reduced demands for propulsion
system performance.
The net result was a technological focus away from the needs of launch vehicles.
Storable hypergolic rocket propellants were much better than liquid oxygen and
kerosene for missile systems, but also were much more expensive, far more hazardous,
and produced significantly lower performance. The inertial guidance systems used on
the later missiles were far superior for weapons systems to the radio guidance used on
early ICBM's purposes, but also cost far more and were somewhat less reliable. For
ballistic missiles, solid rocket motors provide faster reaction time, lower operating costs,
and less vulnerability than liquid engines, but also have lower performance and are
essentially impossible to test before flight. Despite the obvious disadvantages, the use
of the new missile technology for space launch purposes was accepted and encouraged.
Cost was one reason; the missile technology was "free" to the space launch industry.
Even more importantly, for the most part, the same people were involved in the design of
the replacement missile systems as were charged with handling space launch needs.
The prevailing attitude asserted that later designs were intrinsically superior to older
hardware, and the applicability of the technology really didn't matter. Better was indeed
the enemy of good! A new mythology, which urged that missile advancements (and
disadvantages) be carried over to launch vehicles, ruled the day. Except for some upper
stages, very few space launch developments were pursued, and for the most part
ballistic missile requirements defined space launch capabilities.
For their part, the Soviets ignored the Missile Mythology and continued to
develop new dedicated space boosters vastly different from the ballistic missiles they
deployed in even larger numbers than the U.S. They also continued to utilize their
space booster derivatives of the SS-6, a rocket which had more in common with the V-2
technology than any U.S. system. Soviet propulsion system research and development
continued, unabated by the parallel developments in missile research.
The one noteworthy exception to the Missile Mythology was the Saturn series of
boosters. Designed by the Von Braun team, the Saturn series was focused toward one
end: manned moon missions. In the end it accomplished its objective supremely well,
but unfortunately yielded few advancements that were applicable to the Nation's overall
space launch needs. Once the Apollo program ended, so did the requirement for the
Saturn series. Ironically, some of the most useful launch developments of the 1960's
came not from the actual manned program, but from its supporting unmanned elements.
For example, the premier upper stage engine in use today, the Pratt and Whitney RL-10,
was developed to place the unmanned Surveyor spacecraft on the Moon. The rocket
motors developed for Surveyor's descent stage formed the technological basis for most
solid propellant upper stages. In contrast, none of the Saturn propulsion systems is in
use today.
By the late 1960's the deficiencies in the Missile Mythology approach had
become obvious. Space boosters clearly had requirements entirely separate in nature
from those of the newer ballistic missiles, and continuing the use of early ballistic

missile-derived systems led to lower reliability and much higher costs than would
employing dedicated space boosters. An associated and important realization was that
the experiments of the 1960's had verified the immense utility of satellites to meet
military, scientific, and even industrial requirements. Space was no toy; it was going to
be around to stay, and would even grow in importance. A key factor clearly was going to
be cost-effective launch capabilities. The Air Force response to these realizations was a
concept termed Big Dumb Booster.

Pretty Big But Not So Dumb
The Big Dumb Booster concept was borne of the realization that the Missile
Technology Mythology was not yielding the most cost effective and reliable launch
vehicles. Big Dumb Booster proponents focused on the idea that certain booster
components could be built relatively cheaply, not push the state of the art in terms of
performance, and still meet requirements. For example, the weight of first stage
hardware has a relatively small impact on the system's total performance, but can have
large effect on cost if every effort is made to pare every unneeded ounce. One of the
first steps toward implementing the Big Dumb Booster idea was a rocket engine built in a
shipyard by commercial practices rather than aerospace standards. The engine was no
masterpiece of lightweight engineering, but it was both robust and remarkably
inexpensive.
The "dumb" element of Big Dumb Booster was probably based on the recognition
that upper stages as well as the spacecraft they carried incorporated their own inertial
guidance systems; with proper software and interfaces these could guide the lower
stages during ascent. While it increases the complexity of integrating the flight vehicle,
such an approach could lower costs by the elimination of unneeded, highly expensive
hardware. The dumb booster approach was used on a large number of Air Force Thor
missions with a fair degree of success.
Big Dumb Booster seemed to be practical and appeared to be promising, but
before it really got started it was pushed out of the way by a new mythology.

But It's Gotta Be Manned
As the Apollo program reached its ultimate goal with the flight of Apollo 11 in July
1969, there was a recognition in some circles that it also meant the end of the only
established justification for the manned space program. The manned program had been
focused on getting to the Moon. The only other well developed justification for manned
missions, Earth observation, had been found to be better performed by automatic
systems. The solution that was developed was to tie the requirements that needed nor
justification to the manned program. The Space Shuttle program was born, and with it,
the Manned Mythology.
The Manned Mythology asserted that the payloads to meet scientific civil, military
and commercial requirements could best be hauled into orbit by a reusable launch
vehicle. And by placing a crew aboard that vehicle, a manned program could be had "for
free", piggybacking on the established need for the unmanned payloads. To a large
extent, the needs of the unmanned and manned were compromised by one another.
Space Shuttle payloads had to meet the strict requirements of the manned system, but

in order to meet the payload's requirements the manned system was the first which
could conduct no new exploration.
The Manned Mythology essentially stopped all space booster development in the
U.S. for a period of almost twenty-five years. The only significant work done during the
period was merely additional adaptation and modification of the existing ICBM-based
boosters. A few small private firms tried to develop their own boosters in the late 1980's,
but were not very successful. The Air Force finally received approval to develop the
Titan IV, but it was merely "complementary" to the Space Shuttle, and in any case was a
minimum modification version of the earlier Titan IIIE, which was in turn a combination of
1960's Titan and Centaur technology.
Following the Challenger mishap in January 1986, U.S. policy changed radically,
but was still based on use of the same vehicles which Big Dumb Booster was intended
to replace in the late 1960's. The results of the Missile Mythology once more were felt,
and its shortcoming once more became apparent.

A New Approach
Even as work went on to restart closed production lines and recover U.S. space
launch capabilities in the late 1980's, the Air Force and NASA struggled with the best
way out of both the missile and manned mythologies. The result was two abortive, joint
programs, the Advanced Launch System (ALS) and the National Launch System (NLS).
To a degree, ALS and NLS embraced the Big Dumb Booster concept in that most of the
emphasis would be on low manufacturing cost rather than high performance. Where Big
Dumb Booster had tried shipyard manufacturing techniques, the two later programs took
inspiration from the automotive industry. Both programs were canceled due to lack of
Congressional support.
Even before ALS and NLS withered, a new mythology arose, the Operational
Mythology.

The Operational Era
Air Force Space Command was created in 1983 and in 1990 it assumed control
of the Air Force's space launch mission and its space launch test ranges. In that era
there was much enthusiasm within the Air Force for moving military space capabilities
into the operational realm. Space systems were unique for many years because they
were specified, procured, and largely operated by the same organization, Air Force
Systems Command. After years of dealing with space capabilities in a "Research and
Development" context, it was reasoned that fully employing the military utility of space
capabilities would require they be handled in the same manner as other Air Force
systems. Transfer of launch capabilities to Space Command, "Operationalization", was
one aspect of this new approach. The other aspect of the Operational Mythology would
apply to not only Space Command but to nearly every aspect of the Air Force's use of
space : Normalization.
Operationalization of space launch capabilities was meant to refer to the process
of bringing developmental systems on line. Almost immediately the concept essentially
was translated into asserting that space launch systems were the same as airplanes or
ballistic missiles and proceeding from there. The launch organizations were redesigned
using the new approach, including the "Objective Wing Structure" that asserted that the
entire Air Force could best be operated like an operational flying wing. It was assumed
that the shortcomings of the existing systems could be overcome by simply pretending

they could be operated like F-16's or Minuteman missiles. It even became standard
procedure for every new launch vehicle procurement to contain at least optional
provisions for operation of the system by uniformed military crews.
Normalization applied the Operationalization concept to the area of logistic
support. Space boosters, their launch pads, and the launch ranges would be "brought
into the fold" by applying the same logistic support concepts used for other operational
systems. In the words of a Pentagon logistics expert "You people do everything so
expensively because you don't do it like everyone else. We are going to fix that!"
Of course, there were other "advantages" which made the Operational Mythology
very attractive. It arose just at the time when the post-cold war downsizing was
occurring and therefore was seen as a highly attractive by certain endangered career
fields. Uniformed military "operators" no longer needed elsewhere could be moved into
the new mission. Air Logistics Centers facing closure could take on the new space
workload to help justify their existence. At the Pentagon, the "normalized" space launch
funding sources would become more easily available for the inevitable annual
reprioritizations. The birds launched from the Cape and Vandenberg would feather a lot
of new nests!
The Operational Mythology was immediately applied to the Air Force's newest
space booster program, the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), its biggest
launch range upgrade effort Range Standardization and Automation (RSA), and to the
reorganization of the launch organizations and ranges.

Evolution is Better, and Besides It's a Lot Cheaper
EELV was designed to replace the canceled ALS and NLS programs and is the
latest attempt to develop an alternative to both the Missile Mythology and the Manned
Mythology. The problems with the two earlier philosophies had been recognized; that
was the essence of the ALS and NLS programs. ALS and NLS failed to gain adequate
support not due to a renewed belief in the two older mythologies, but primarily because
Congress balked at an investment of over $10 billion for what appeared to be a relatively
incremental improvement over the Space Shuttle and the existing expendable fleet.
EELV resembles Big Dumb Booster, ALS, and NLS in the program's emphasis
on lower launch costs as its primary objective. Unlike ALS and NLS, for EELV the lower
cost is to be achieved less by technology advancements and more by careful use of
existing technology. In some respects EELV is a 1990's version of Big Dumb Booster,
but for the high tech era in which even bombs aren't dumb.
Some of the Operational Mythology concepts which were to be applied to EELV
included standard Air Force modification management procedures, increased direct Air
Force involvement in launch operations and processing, standard base supply logistics,
Air Force maintenance responsibility for all ground support facilities, and delivery of only
"operationally ready" and accepted flight hardware to the launch bases. In the end none
of this was to be, and EELV now plans to utilize a radically different commercial style
procurement approach. For the next generation of space boosters, the Operational
Mythology ended before it really got started.

Operationalization, Ended Almost Before it Begun

There were several factors that caused the abandonment of the Operational
Mythology for EELV. First, even at its most robust predicted launch rates, it became
obvious that space launch is still a high value, limited volume business. Standard base
supply support and dedicated military launch crews make little sense for a mere fifteen
military launches a year (the target number specified by the EELV program), and even
that high a rate was recognized as being unrealistic. An even more important reason
was that by 1997 it became obvious that commercial launch requirements had and
would outstrip those of the military for the foreseeable future. EELV would have to be,
first and foremost, a commercial success for it to be viable. A commercial EELV
program would exist and thrive or the program would not exist at all.
In the final analysis, resource requirements doomed the application of the
Operational Mythology to EELV. The Air Force finally decided that in the era of both
downsizing and a high operational tempo it could simply not to afford to "make" what it
could "buy." Contractors had, did, and could continue to launch space missions, and
would be doing it in any case to meet commercial requirements. But only the uniformed
military could handle missions such as Desert Storm, Provide Comfort, Just Cause, and
the other deployments required by national policy. This fact forced a recognition which
had been apparent for some time, that the real military product and the real space
mission was the data stream from space which enabled air ground, and sea forces to do
their jobs, not all of the capabilities which enabled that data stream to exist. The cow
doesn't have to wear a blue suit in order for the Air Force to drink milk.
The other great applications of the Operational Mythology began much earlier
than EELV and thus were further along when the decision was made to abandon the
concept. The huge launch range upgrade effort, Range Standardization and Automation
(RSA), and the organizational restructuring of the launch organizations and ranges,
largely predated the recognition of the philosophy's limitations. These approaches are
being reexamined in the light of the same realizations which led to the revision of EELV.
In fact, now the Air Force is planning on largely withdrawing from direct space launch
operations and possibly even from the traditional base support functions. The approach
being taken for EELV is intended to be the first big step toward a commercialization
concept in which the Air Force would procure satellites "delivered to orbit" rather than to
a loading dock. The satellite manufacturer would be responsible for procuring launch
services.

The Commercial Space Launch Era
There is now a general recognition that we have entered the Commercial Space
Launch Era. Rather than being the exclusive province of governments, space launch
capabilities will be a commodity which can be purchased in the same manner as virtually
all other elements of aerospace power. Governments will be the customers of the
industry, and minority customers at that, rather than its enablers.

Why the Checkered Past?
Why in the field of space launch has the United States so often and with such
energy proceeded to follow ultimately unproductive and inappropriate mythologies?
There is no clear cut answer.
The Vanguard Mythology was rooted in the core beliefs of the Eisenhower
Administration; the same core beliefs created NASA. In contrast, the other mythologies
cannot be tied to a particular set of political beliefs. The Missile Mythology was created

by the industry and government experts involved, as was the Manned Mythology. In
these cases the political leaders did not drive the mythology but, at most, approved of it.
The Nixon, Ford, Carter, and initially the Reagan Administrations accepted the Manned
Mythology as an element of national policy, but did not invent it. Resource
considerations, in other words the amount of money available, undoubtedly greatly
influenced the Missile and Manned Mythologies and the politicians certainly set those
policies. But in neither case can we conclude that the mythology emanated from the top
as it did for Vanguard.
In the case of the Operational Mythology, there appears to be no specific national
policy which inspired it. The Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative
certainly indicated an increased willingness to utilize space for military purposes, but that
did not equate to the Operational Mythology. The Operational Mythology was developed
within the Air Force to meet Air Force objectives, not political objectives as such.
So what drove the creation of the mythologies? It is interesting to note that in
each case there existed a constituency which saw the promotion and enactment of the
mythology to be in its own personal best interests. In each case there were individuals
who believed that convincing others of the validity of the mythology, or at least of their
particular version of it, would lead to personal advancement, power, and glory.
However, this may clarify our understanding of certain aspects of the mythologies or
even the enthusiasm with which they were pursued, but does not necessarily explain the
basis for the development of the concepts that ultimately proved to be so wrong. There
is no one reason for the creation of the mythologies; they were the products of the times
and of personal interests.

The Future Mythologies?
Now that we are in the Commercial Space Launch Era, are we entering into a
well reasoned approach to meeting the Nation's launch requirements or fruitlessly
pursuing yet another new mythology? Only time will tell, but already there are
indications that the commercial-style approach has its limitations. The Air Force's
original "hands off' launch services procurement which yielded the Pegasus Small
Launch Vehicle contract, had to be reworked to allow increased Air Force systems
Program Office involvement following a series of launch failures. The U.S. Navy's first
few "delivery to orbit" procurements resulted in the satellite being delivered to the wrong
orbit (in one case) or to the right orbit, but not in working condition (in two other cases).
This was good news in that Navy didn't have to pay for failed missions, but on the other
hand, the capabilities the service needed weren't provided, either. The recent failures of
both Air Force and commercial missions proves that space launch may be routine but is
still by no means easy. The commercial-style approach now being adopted doesn't
appear to be a mythology yet, but could well develop into one.
The other new item coming onto the space launch scene is Reusable Launch
Vehicles (RLVs). It is asserted that RLVs will surely be the wave of the future; some
have even recommended abandoning all other launch vehicle development. RLVs
already seem to be developing their own mythology.

Is There An Answer?
It appears that the only answer is to recognize our national tendency to embrace
new and unproven space launch ideas and also recognize the need for a logical,
reasoned and technically appropriate basis for them. Mythologies may in fact be

inevitable, and we need to recognize this fact and beware. And that is the purpose of
this paper.
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